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Abstract
Recent work in motor control demonstrates that humans take their own motor uncertainty into account, adjusting the timing
and goals of movement so as to maximize expected gain. Visual sensitivity varies dramatically with retinal location and target,
and models of optimal visual search typically assume that the visual system takes retinal inhomogeneity into account in
planning eye movements. Such models can then use the entire retina rather than just the fovea to speed search. Using a simple
decision task, we evaluated human ability to compensate for retinal inhomogeneity. We first measured observers’ sensitivity for
targets, varying contrast and eccentricity. Observers then repeatedly chose between targets differing in eccentricity and
contrast, selecting the one they would prefer to attempt: e.g., a low contrast target at 2u versus a high contrast target at 10u.
Observers knew they would later attempt some of their chosen targets and receive rewards for correct classifications. We
evaluated performance in three ways. Equivalence: Do observers’ judgments agree with their actual performance? Do they
correctly trade off eccentricity and contrast and select the more discriminable target in each pair? Transitivity: Are observers’
choices self-consistent? Dominance: Do observers understand that increased contrast improves performance? Decreased
eccentricity? All observers exhibited patterned failures of equivalence, and seven out of eight observers failed transitivity. There
were significant but small failures of dominance. All these failures together reduced their winnings by 10%–18%.
Citation: Zhang H, Morvan C, Maloney LT (2010) Gambling in the Visual Periphery: A Conjoint-Measurement Analysis of Human Ability to Judge Visual
Uncertainty. PLoS Comput Biol 6(12): e1001023. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001023
Editor: Karl J. Friston, University College London, United Kingdom
Received June 24, 2010; Accepted November 4, 2010; Published December 2, 2010
Copyright:  2010 Zhang et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: LTM was supported by the Humboldt Foundation. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or
preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: hang.zhang@nyu.edu
Introduction
An average human eye has as many as 4.6 million cones in a
retinal area of 1019 mm
2 [1] centered on the fovea but the
distribution of cones across the retina is far from uniform
(Figure 1A). As a consequence of retinal inhomogeneity and
post-receptoral processing [2], observer’s performance in psycho-
physical tasks can vary markedly with retinal eccentricity. This
variation can be summarized by a retinal sensitivity curve such as
the one shown in Figure 1B.
The retinal sensitivity curve in Figure 1B is a plot of the
probability of correct discrimination as a function of retinal
eccentricity. The observer attempted to discriminate two possible
configural targets (Figure 1C) consisting of a small circle
superimposed on a square. As shown, the observer’s probability
of correct discrimination is close to one when the target is near the
fovea and drops to chance beyond 12 degrees.
Retinal scaling curves for many kinds of visual judgments have
been measured [3–6] and researchers modeling visual search
typically assume that the visual system effectively has access to
estimates of visual sensitivity for different kinds of targets at
different eccentricities [7–10]. This information is needed to
correctly combine visual data from disparate retinal locations,
detect the target or plan the next saccade. Since the mapping
between eccentricity and visual sensitivity may differ for different
kinds of targets, the amount of information needed to plan visual
search well is potentially very large.
We examined whether human observers have access to this
information in a simple decision task. In the first part of the
experiment (calibration) we mapped retinal scaling curves for the
configural target at three contrasts, High, Medium and Low.
Targets were placed along a horizontal line passing through the
fovea and each target could be thought of as an ordered pair e,c ðÞ
where e is horizontal distance from the fovea, c is contrast.
In the main part of the experiment (decision), the observers were
asked to judge which of two configural targets, differing in contrast
and in retinal eccentricity, e,c ðÞ or e’,c’ ðÞ , was more discriminable.
A judgment that e,c ðÞ is/was more discriminable than e’,c’ ðÞ is
denoted e,c ðÞ ] e’,c’ ðÞ . Observers knew that, at the end of the
experiment, they would be allowed to attempt to classify some of
the targets they had chosen, receiving a reward for each correct
response. It was therefore in their interest to select the more
discriminable eccentricity-contrast pair on each trial.
Unlike typical decision tasks [11], this decision task does not
involve a tradeoff between probability and value: we never varied
the payoffs for success and failure. Successful performance requires
only that the observer correctly orders probabilities. Performance
would also be unaffected by monotone increasing transformations
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literature [11–13].
The decision task is an example of a conjoint measurement task
[14–15]. We vary contrast and eccentricity and see how these
variations affect the observer’s ordering of eccentricity-contrast
pairs e,c ðÞ ] e’,c’ ðÞ by discriminability. If the observer’s judgments
satisfy certain conditions that, in effect, assess their coherence or
self-consistency, then the experimenter can potentially recover
estimates of the observer’s ‘‘subjective’’ retinal sensitivity curves for
each contrast [14–15] and compare them to observers’ actual
performance. If one or more of the conditions fail, then we further
conclude that the observer’s choices are not based on a coherent
model of their own retinal sensitivity.
We test the observer’s knowledge of his own ability to
discriminate such targets in three ways, illustrated in Figure 2A.
The first is a test of equivalence: Can observers correctly judge which
pairs e,c ðÞ and e’,c’ ðÞ are equally discriminable? We can represent
these pairs by indifference curves as shown in Figure 2A.
The second test is transitivity: for any choice of eccentricities
e,e’,e’’ and contrasts c,c’,c’’,i f e,c ðÞ ] e’,c’ ðÞ and e’,c’ ðÞ ] e’’,c’’ ðÞ ,
then e,c ðÞ ] e’’,c’’ ðÞ . Transitivity is a test of the self-consistency or
coherence of observers’ judgments.
The third is a test of dominance:i fcwc’, does the observer
correctly judge that e,c ðÞ ] e,c’ ðÞ for any choice of eccentricity e?
And if eve’, does the observer correctly judge that e,c ðÞ ] e’,c ðÞ
for any choice of contrast c? (Of course, we must verify
experimentally that the two dominance claims are in fact true
for our experimental conditions). Dominance is evidently the
weakest of the three tests.
The three tests are distinct: an observer who fails equivalence may
still satisfy transitivity and dominance. This outcome would imply
that, while his or her estimates of discriminability are in error, the
estimates he or she has do, at least, cohere. An observer who fails
transitivity cannot trade off contrast and eccentricity in any
consistent way, but he or she may still know that more contrast
improvesperformanceand thatperformancenearthe foveaisbetter.
Methods
Ethic statement
The experiment had been approved by the University
Committee on Activities Involving Human Subjects (UCAIHS)
of New York University and informed consent was given by the
observer prior to the experiment.
Apparatus
Stimuli were displayed on a 19-in. Sony Trinitron Multiscan
G500 monitor controlled by a Dell Pentium D Optiplex 745
computer. The monitor was run at a frame rate of 100 Hz with
128061024 resolution in pixels. A forehead bar and chinrest were
used to help the observer maintain a viewing distance of 57 cm. At
that distance, the full display subtended 40.4u630.3u. The
observer viewed the display binocularly.
Monitoring fixation
Observers were required to fixate a fixation cross and all stimuli
were presented relative to this fixation cross. We used an Eyelink II
eye tracker to verify that observers did not make eye movements
away from the fixation cross. At the beginning of each trial drift
correction was made at the fixation cross. The criterion of eye
movement was set to be a speed over 10 deg/s or an offset over 1
deg from the fixation cross. A trial would be cancelled if the
fixation constraint were violated during the trial. The eye tracker
was calibrated initially, drift corrected for each trail and re-
calibrated after every 100 trials or when drift exceeded 5 deg.
Stimuli
Stimuli were presented against a uniform gray (39.1 cd/m
2)
background. The fixation cross was black, spanning 0:60|0:60 at
the center of the screen. The target was a 10|10 lighter gray
(67.1 cd/m
2) square with an even lighter gray dot of 0:160
diameter at its top or bottom. The luminance of the dot could be
74.4, 80.7, or 91.4 cd/m
2, i.e., a contrast of 1:11, 1:20 or 1:36
relative to the square. We refer these three levels of contrast as low,
medium, and high contrast. The contrast c of a stimulus and the
eccentricity at which it was presented, formed an eccentricity-contrast
pair e,c ðÞ .
Color codes and location cues. Each contrast was
associated with a colored cue, which was a filled circle of 0:60
diameter behind the fixation cross. The colors for the low,
medium, and high contrast were red, blue and white, respectively.
The location of target was cued by a 10|10black frame square at
the location of the would-be target. Targets or location cues were
located at 18 possible locations uniformly distributed in the range
of 0:80 to 17:50 to the right of the fixation cross.
Procedure and design
The experiment consisted of two three-hour sessions completed
on two successive days. Observers were advised to take a break
every about 350 trials and allowed to take breaks whenever
necessary. Each observer went through the two tasks in sequence:
calibration, then decision. The time courses of both tasks are
illustrated in Figure 2B.
Calibration task
The calibration task allowed us to map probability correct as a
functionofeccentricityforeachofthethreecontrasts.Theobserver’s
task was to decide whether the dot was at the top or at the bottom
(Figure 2B). Fixation was monitored. No feedback was given.
For each of the three contrasts, the target could appear at any of
18 possible locations, i.e., 18 possible eccentricities, evenly spaced
from 2u to 12.2u on the right of the fixation cross. There were five
blocks, in each of which each location of each contrast repeated for
six times, half top and half bottom, randomly mixed together. Each
observer completed 3 contrasts6540 trials=1620 calibration trials.
Author Summary
Human ability to discriminate drops dramatically with
increasing distance from the center of vision. If you fixate a
word on a page, you likely can not read words a short
distance away. Because of this retinal inhomogeneity, we
need to move our eyes to search a scene. The efficiency of
search depends on how well the visual system compen-
sates for inhomogeneity in planning eye movements. We
used a simple decision task to find out what the observer
‘‘knows’’ about his or her own retina. We first measured
observers’ sensitivity for targets, varying contrast and
eccentricity. Observers then repeatedly chose between
targets differing in eccentricity and contrast, selecting the
one they would prefer to attempt: e.g., a low contrast
target at 2u versus a high contrast target at 10u. Could
observers correctly trade off contrast and eccentricity and
pick the more discriminable of the two targets? We found
that observers exhibited large, patterned errors in their
choices, making choices that were not even self-consistent.
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the first session and 12 practice trials for the second session. To
keep observers motivated, we rewarded observers with a bonus up
to $10 based on their overall probability correct in the calibration
task of each session.
The probability correct of the calibration task was fitted against
eccentricity with a Quick-Weibull psychometric function [16–17]:
y(e)~0:5z0:5exp { e=a ðÞ
b

ð1Þ
where a is a position parameter and b is a steepness parameter.
With Equation 1, we could compute the probability correct for
any eccentricity. We used these functions in the construction of
decision trials.
Decision task
We described the decision task in the Introduction. In this task,
observers chose between two targets of different combinations of
contrastand retinal eccentricity. But rather than using real targets, we
used alocation cueanda color cue to indicate aneccentricity-contrast
pair. The observer’s task was to choose the target they preferred to
attempt later (Figure 2B). As in the calibration task, observers were
required to fixate the fixation cross before the response display.
Figure 1. Retinal inhomogeneity. A. The density of cone photoreceptors in the human retina. The density of cones is the highest at the
fovea and drops sharply with increasing eccentricity. Plotted data from Curcio et al. [1]. Eccentricity in millimeter was transformed into degree using
Drasdo and Fowler’s [44] curve for retinal eccentricity and areal magnification. B. Retinal scaling curve for one contrast and one observer. The
retinal scaling curve is a plot of probability of correct response as a function of retinal eccentricity in degrees of visual angle. Near the fovea the
observer is consistently correct while beyond 120 the observer is at chance. C. The calibration task. On each trial, one of two configurations (inset)
was displayed. The observer’s task was to judge which of the two configurations was presented. The contrast and retinal location (eccentricity) varied
from trial to trial.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001023.g001
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signify eccentricity-contrast pairs. First, if observers had seen real
targets in a trial, they could base their decision on their immediate
perception of the targets, in effect simulating the visual judgment.
Second, with real targets, observers might mistake one contrast
condition for another.
Figure 2. Methods. A. Conjoint measurement: testing equivalence, transitivity, and dominance. In testing equivalence we used data
from the calibration phase of the experiment to compare the actual discriminability of eccentricity-contrast pairs that observers judged to be equally
discriminable. Observers could err in selecting equally discriminable pairs but still make judgments that were self-consistent. The contours shown are
examples of contours of equal discriminability. We tested self-consistency by testing transitivity. See text. The test of dominance evaluates whether
observers understood that, all else equal, higher contrast or lower eccentricity led to better performance. See text. B. Time courses of the
calibration and decision tasks. In the calibration task we measured retinal scaling curves for three contrasts. The observer learned to associate
each of the three contrasts with a color code (inset). In the decision task, the contrast of each e,c ðÞ pair was signaled using color codes. Note that the
target contrasts in the inset legend are just for illustration and are considerably higher than those used in the experiment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001023.g002
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the beginning of the experiment during the calibration task and we
verified that they had learned these associations by a short ‘‘quiz’’
before the decision task.
Observers knew that, at the end of the experiment, four of their
choices would be chosen at random and that they would attempt
to identify targets in the conditions corresponding to each choice.
A correct response would lead to a $5 reward. Correct response for
all of the four trials would result in a $20 bonus.
To measure the point of subjective indifference (equivalence)
between targets that differed in contrast, we used one-up, one-
down adaptive staircase procedures. In a staircase, one target of
one contrast was fixed in eccentricity and the target of the other
contrast varied in eccentricity. The fixed contrast in each staircase
had an eccentricity corresponding to a probability correct of 0.6,
0.7, 0.8, or 0.9 separately estimated for each observer based on
their calibration data. We estimated the eccentricity that the
observer considered to be equally discriminable for the variable
contrast. Each staircase consisted of 70 trials. There were 12
staircases (3 contrasts64 probabilities), randomly interleaved. That
is, 12 staircases670 trials=840 staircase trials. Based on these
staircase trials, we tested equivalence and transitivity.
To test dominance, we included trials in which the two targets
had different eccentricities but the same contrast (equi-contrast trials),
or different contrasts but the same eccentricity (equi-eccentricity
trials). The possible contrasts were low, medium, and high. The
possible eccentricities were the eccentricities corresponding to a
probability correct of 0.75 for each of the three contrasts,
computed with the functions estimated in the calibration task for
the particular observer. The number of equi-contrast trials was 3
contrasts63 eccentricity combinations610 repetitions=90. The
number of equi-eccentricity trials was 3 eccentricities63 contrast
combinations610 repetitions=90 as well.
The 840 staircase trials and 180 dominance trials were mixed in
a random order, divided into three blocks and completed in the
second session after the calibration task. There were 24 practice
trials before the formal experimental trials.
Observers
Eight observers, four female and four male, participated. None of
them was aware of the purpose of the experiment. All observers had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The observers each received
US $12/hour for their time and a performance-relatedbonus.Total
payment ranged from US $87 to US $112 across observers.
Results
Visual sensitivity curves
For each observer, we fit the data of the calibration task to Equation
1 separately for each contrast using the maximum likelihood method.
Figure 3 shows both the data and fit for each observer.
Equivalence test
From the 12 staircases of the decision task, we acquired 12 pairs
of eccentricity-contrast pairs judged to be equally discriminable
e,c ðÞ * e’,c’ ðÞ by the observer. Four of them had the target of low
contrast in fixed eccentricity and the target of medium contrast in
variable eccentricity, which we call a low-to-medium mapping.
Another four staircases were medium-to-high mappings and a
third set of four high-to-low mappings.
For each observer, we computed the differences between the
actual probabilities correct of the fixed and variable targets (based
on calibration data) and examined whether they significantly
deviated from zero. We used a bootstrap method [18] to estimate
95% confidence intervals for the probability difference of each pair
for each observer (10,000 resamples). We tested whether
differences in probability were significant at an overall level of
.05 with a Bonferroni correction for 12 tests.
Figure 4A shows the differences of probability correct in each
staircase separately for each observer. The vertical axis denotes
probability correct. Each arrowed line points from the fixed target to
the variable target. If a subjective indifference pair has identical
probability correct for the fixed and variable targets, the arrowed line
should be horizontal. Slanted lines correspond to differences in
probability. Pairs with significant probability difference are in magenta.
We noticed that observers’ errors were not random in direction.
In Figure 4A, the magenta lines for the same observer deviate from
the vertical orientation either clockwise or counter-clockwise, but
never in both ways. This pattern is an indication that the observer
consistently overestimated or consistently underestimated the
effect of differences in contrast on visual sensitivity.
To verify this claim we computed probability difference of the
lower contrast target minus the higher contrast target averaged
across the 12 subjective indifference pairs for each observer.
According to two-tailed Student’s t-tests, all observers’ mean
probability difference was significantly different from zero (p,.05).
Among the eight observers, three overestimated the visual
sensitivity difference and the other five underestimated it.
We also measured observers’ errors in eccentricity. The correct
eccentricity of the variable target in a staircase was defined as the
eccentricity where the variable target had the same probability
correct as the fixed target. Eccentricity error of a subjective
indifference pair was the actual eccentricity of the variable target
minus the correct eccentricity. The absolute error averaged across
the 12 pairs was 1.6, 5.8, 1.9, 7.5, 2.2, 7.7, 6.4, and 5.0 degrees
respectively for S1–S8. Their median was 5.4 degrees. Therefore,
observers’ errors in the decision task were unlikely to be a
byproduct of lack of ability to discriminate eccentricity.
Transitivity test
In the equivalence test, we tested whether observers made
judgments consistent with their actual ability to classify stimuli
differing in contrast and eccentricity. They did not do so. Next we
examined whether observers’ judgments, even though in error,
were self-consistent by testing transitivity (one of the necessary
conditions for a conjoint measurement representation) as follows.
An observer’s judgments are transitive if and only if, for all choices
of eccentricities e,e’,e’’ and contrasts c,c’,c’’:i f e,c ðÞ ] e’,c’ ðÞ and
e’,c’ ðÞ ] e’’,c’’ ðÞ , then e,c ðÞ ] e’’,c’’ ðÞ . We test transitivity in a
slightly different form by measuring eccentricity-contrast pairs
e,c ðÞ , e’,c’ ðÞ that are judged equally discriminable. We denote
equal discriminablity as e,c ðÞ & e’,c’ ðÞ . We test the following: if
e,c ðÞ & e’,c’ ðÞ and e’,c’ ðÞ & e’’,c’’ ðÞ , then e,c ðÞ & e’’,c’’ ðÞ .
Suppose the function e’~CL?M e ðÞtransforms any eccentricity
e at low contrast into an eccentricity e’ at medium contrast that the
observer judges to be equally discriminable. That is, the observer,
rightly or wrongly, judges e,c ðÞ & e’,c’ ðÞ . We refer to e’~CL?M e ðÞ
as an equivalence transformation.
From the decision task, we can estimate the equivalence
transformations of low-to-medium, medium-to-high, and high-to-
low contrasts, respectively denoted as CL?M e ðÞ , CM?H e ðÞ , and
CH?L e ðÞ . The criterion for transitivity is that transitivity holds,
CH?L CM?H CL?M e ðÞ ðÞ ðÞ should transform e back to e, that is,
e~CH?L CM?H CL?M e ðÞ ðÞ ðÞ ð 2Þ
In our transitivity test, we assume that the subjective probability
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a function of eccentricity in the form of Equation 1. An
equivalence transformation from one contrast to another contrast
would then be linear on a log scale (see Text S1 for proof).
loge’~a1?2 logezb1?2 ð3Þ
where e is the eccentricity for contrast 1, e’ is the eccentricity for
contrast 2, and a1?2 and b1?2 are parameters to be estimated.
If Equation 2 is satisfied, we should have
aL?MaM?HaH?L~1
bL?MaM?HaH?LzbM?HaH?LzbH?L~0
ð4Þ
Define A~aL?MaM?HaH?L{1, B~bL?MaM?HaH?LzbM?
HaH?LzbH?L. Testing for failure of transitivity requires only
that we test whether either of A and B is significantly different
from zero.
For each observer, we fitted Equation 3 separately for the low-
to-medium, medium-to-high, and high-to-low transformations.
With the estimated a : ðÞ’s and b : ðÞ’s we computed A and B.W e
obtained the 95% confidence intervals (Bonferroni corrected for
two conditions) of A and B using a bootstrap method [18] by
resampling the staircase data for 10,000 times.
Only one observer (S5) passed the transitivity test. The
remaining seven observers’ mean A and B values were both
significantly different from zero. Interesting, all the seven
observers’ deviations had the same direction. That is, all the A’s
were less than zero (median across observers=20.60). All the B’s
were greater than zero (median across observers=1.06). If, for any
observer, A and B errors were independent and equally often
positive or negative, the probability for all the seven observers to
have a less-than-zero A and a greater-than-zero B would be
1=4 ðÞ
7~6|10{5. Therefore, the observed common pattern of
failure of transitivity is unlikely to be the result of measurement
error.
Figure 4B shows a sequence of transformations. The three axes
in each subplot represent the eccentricities of the low, medium,
and high contrasts in the log scale. For each observer, we start
from a specific eccentricity at the low contrast find the equivalent
eccentricity at the medium contrast, then we pass from medium to
high and then high to low. If the transformations satisfy
transitivity, we should return to the same eccentricity at the low
contrast axis after going through the three transformations, low-to-
medium, medium-to-high and high-to-low. If transitivity holds, we
stop after one set of three transformations (lowRmediumRhighR
low). If it does not we continue with a second set of three
transformations to make the pattern of intransitivity easier to
visualize.
Figure 4B illustrates the transitivity failure of seven out of eight
observers and their common pattern of failure. We move from one
axis to another axis in an arbitrary counter-clockwise way. Note
that all the observers that failed the transitivity test had plots that
tended to ‘‘corkscrew’’ outward. That is, when eccentricity is
transformed from low contrast to medium contrast and then to
high contrast, the resulting eccentricity difference between the low
and high contrasts tended to be larger than when they mapped
from low to high directly.
Dominance test
Observers failed the equivalence test and, with one exception,
the transitivity test. The dominance test is, in conjoint measure-
ment terms, a test that observer’s preferences form a weak order
satisfying single cancellation [15]. We are asking whether
observers, given two targets of equal contrast at different
Figure 3. Calibration task: Visual sensitivity curves. Probability of correct response is plotted against retinal eccentricity for each of three
contrasts. Each panel corresponds to one observer. Circles denote data. Solid lines denote the fits of Equation 1 to data. Red, blue, and gray
respectively denote low, medium, and high contrast.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001023.g003
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discriminable (equi-contrast dominance) and that, given two
targets at the same eccentricity, judge the target with higher
contrast to be more discriminable (equi-eccentricity dominance).
Figure 4C show the percentage of dominance errors for each
observer. For each observer and condition, we computed the 95%
confidence intervals for the percentage of errors by treating the
true proportion of errors as a random variable with a beta
distribution whose parameters are determined by the observed
numbers of errors and non-errors. Although the percentage of
errors was significantly larger than zero for most of the observers
in either condition, the values were small. The medians across
observers were 8.3% and 11%, respectively for the equi-contrast
trials and equi-eccentricity trials. The upper limits of all the
confidence intervals were far below 50%, the chance level.
Discussion
We employed a simple decision task with a conjoint measure-
ment design to investigate what people know about their own
visual uncertainty across the retina. In this task, observers were
asked to judge which of two eccentricity-contrast pairs e,c ðÞ or
e’,c’ ðÞ was more discriminable. We measured the observer’s ability
to discriminate targets varying in contrast and eccentricity
separately in a calibration task. Consequently, we could determine
whether the observer correctly judged which of the two
eccentricity-contrast pairs was more discriminable. We found that
observers’ judgments exhibited large, patterned errors.
Observers may err in judging equally-discriminable pairs, but
be self-consistent in their erroneous judgments. We tested whether
observers’ judgments were transitive. An observer’s judgments are
transitive if and only if, for all choices of eccentricities e,e’,e’’ and
contrasts c,c’,c’’: e,c ðÞ ] e’,c’ ðÞ and e’,c’ ðÞ ] e’’,c’’ ðÞ , then
e,c ðÞ ] e’’,c’’ ðÞ . Seven out of eight observers failed to be transitive,
exhibiting large and patterned errors.
The last test, dominance, assessed whether the observer would
choose the eccentricity-contrast pair with smaller eccentricity if
contrasts were the same or the eccentricity-contrast pair with
larger contrast if eccentricities were equated. An observer need
only have a crude sense that higher contrast leads to better
performance and that performance is better at smaller eccentric-
ities, at least for our choice of stimuli. In particular, an observer
can ‘‘pass’’ dominance without any ability to trade off the
consequences of differences in contrast with differences in
eccentricity. We found significant failures of dominance but the
rate of failure was small and observers were far from the chance
level that would indicate a complete failure of dominance.
The observer maximizes his expected gain by always choosing
the contrast-sensitivity pair that is more readily detectible. If the
probability of detection of one pair is p1 and that of the second is
p2 and p2wp1 then the observer should choose the second. If he
chooses the first then he reduces his winnings by p2{p1 multiplied
by the reward received for a correct response. The consequence of
failures of equivalence, transitivity and dominance, taken together,
was to reduce the expected winnings of all observers by between
10% and 18%.
Previous work amply demonstrates that memory for the location
of targets decays significantly over time [19]. However, in our
experiment each target location were marked by a gray square
present throughout the trials and the discrimination task was to
judge the location of a white dot relative to the gray square.
Consequently, observers’ poor performance in the choice task is
unlikely to be due to any uncertainty concerning the location
where the target would appear.
In conclusion, we find little evidence that observers can
accurately assess their visual sensitivity or even order eccentrici-
ty-contrast pairs consistently. Their consistent patterns of transi-
tivity violation suggest that contrast and eccentricity are treated as
two dimensions that constitute a lexicographic semiorder [20].
We emphasize that the decision task inducing these failures in
judgment was remarkably simple. Since rewards never varied,
failures to judge probability correctly could not be due to assignment
of subjective utilities to rewards. Moreover, any invertible distortion
of probability of the sort commonly found in the decision making
literature [12] would not affect performance in the task at all.
Previous work in cue combination and in motor planning
suggest that the human visuo-motor system has access to estimates
of its own visuo-motor uncertainty in various tasks [21–22].
Human ability to anticipate performance in simple visuo-motor
tasks is well documented. Observers with comparable training in
motor tasks do learn and compensate for their own visuo-motor
variability in later pointing tasks [23–24] and can accurately
estimate their chances of success when shown a rectangular target
and asked to estimate the chances they could hit it [25]. Observers
can also rapidly select which of two pointing target configurations
has higher expected value in a task analogous to ours [26]. In all
these experiments observers considered multiple hypothetical
actions and, without further practice or feedback, selected actions
that maximized expected gain, or nearly so.
Figure 4. Decision task: Results of the three tests. A. Equivalence. For each observer, we estimated 12 eccentricity-contrast pairs e,c ðÞ & e’,c’ ðÞ
that the observer judged to be equally discriminable. We compare observers’ judgments to actual discrimination performance for that observer
measured in the calibration task. Suppose, for example, that an observer judges 20,L ðÞ ~ 80,M ðÞ 80,M ðÞ , that is, a low contrast target at 20 eccentricity is as
discriminable as a medium contrast target at 80. Based on calibration performance, we estimate that probability correct for 20,L ðÞ was 0.93 while that
for 80,M ðÞ was 0.61. We plot these probabilities on the vertical colored axes for L (red) and M (blue) and connect them by a straight line with an arrow
at the end corresponding to the eccentricity-contrast pair whose eccentricity varied in the staircase procedure. If the line segment is horizontal then
the observer correctly judged the pairs to be equally discriminable. If the line segment is significantly slanted, the observer is in error. We plotted
each of the 12 pairs judged equally discriminable (four for each possible pair of contrasts) in this way. The labels L, M, and H, or the colors red, blue,
gray, respectively denote low, medium, and high contrasts. Black denotes an insignificant probability difference while magenta denotes a significant
probability difference. The overall significance level is .05, Bonferroni corrected for 12 conditions (that is, each test had a size of .0042=.05/12). The
observers’ judgments exhibit large, patterned failures. B. Transitivity. Each panel corresponds to one observer. The three axes of the inverse Y
configuration are for the three contrasts. L, M, H denotes low, medium, and high contrasts, respectively. On each axis, the distance of a point to the
center represents the eccentricity of a target, ranging from 10 to 180 on a log scale (see inset). Lines connect eccentricity-contrast pairs of subjective
indifference. For each observer, we started from 1:30,L ðÞ , used the low-to-medium equivalence transformation to locate the eccentricity e for
e,M ðÞ & 1:30,L ðÞ , and then used the medium-to-high mapping to move to the next and so on. If the low-to-medium, medium-to-high, and high-to-
low mappings satisfy transitivity, the fourth point should fall on the starting point. A gap between them implies intransitivity. Observers that
significantly failed the transitivity test are plotted in blue with six mapping lines. The observer that passed the transitivity test is plotted in black
ending at the third mapping line. Notice that all the intransitive mapping lines spiral outward from the center. See text. C. Dominance. Percentage
of errors for each observer and their median in the equi-contrast trials (top) and equi-eccentricity trials (bottom). Error bar denotes the 95%
confidence interval. Dashed lines mark the chance levels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001023.g004
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judgments of retinal sensitivity as a function of contrast and
eccentricity. In contrast to performance in these visual and motor
tasks, however, our observers not only had markedly distorted
representations of their retinal scaling functions for targets
differing in contrast but also made choices that violated
transitivity.
The observed failure to correctly judge visual sensitivity across
retinal positions agrees well with reports in other areas. Patients
suffering from scotomas (a retinal area with reduced visual acuity)
are typically unaware of the scotoma even when testing reveals
near total loss of visual sensitivity outside the fovea [27]. Most
patients with a central scotoma prefer to use their left visual field to
read, although the right visual field is found to be more efficient in
reading than the left visual field [28–29]. Galvin & Williams [30]
noted that, while objective visual performance in many tasks
plummets with distance from the fovea, human observers seem to
experience a retinal field that is unblurred and more or less
uniform. People were found to have underconfidence and
overconfidence at the same time for visual discrimination
performance of stimuli of different size [31].
Our results suggest that people might have difficulty in
integrating the uncertain visual information from across different
retinal eccentricities to speed search. In fact, people are reported
to be suboptimal at choosing where to saccade [32–35].
One possibility is that observers have inaccurate estimates of
retinal eccentricity [36–37], which make precise mapping between
eccentricity and probability of correct impossible. But the
observers’ transitivity failures suggest the failures are more
profound: people likely do not have consistent estimates of visual
sensitivity at all.
Heuristic-based visual search. Our results are in apparent
conflict with the results of Najemnik & Geisler [7,9–10], which
show good human performance in selection of saccades in visual
search. One possibility is that the visual system has accurate
information concerning visual sensitivity to different targets as a
function of eccentricity but that this information is unavailable for
the sort of comparative judgments we considered here.
But a second possibility is that human visual search is actually
based on simple heuristics plus a qualitative understanding of one’s
visual sensitivity map. Such a heuristic-based approach may
approximate ideal performance in some tasks while failing utterly
in others. The experimenter who considers performance in a
limited range of scenes may record behavior that approximates
optimal but is in fact no more than a lucky coincidence of a
heuristic rule and experimental conditions. Such ‘‘apparent
optimality’’ is not rare in behavioral studies of animals [38] or
humans [39].
The task used by Najemnik & Geisler [7,9–10] involved
detection of a Gabor patch in a 1/f field of noise and only the
overall pattern of saccades was considered in evaluating the model.
In contrast, we designed our simple task so that the visual system
can only succeed if it has access to estimates of visual sensitivity for
the range of contrasts and eccentricities we considered.
Dominance was the only test where subjects predominantly
succeeded and their success could be due to a preference for
higher contrast [34] or a preference for locations closer to the
fovea [32]. According to the errors in the equivalence test, among
the seven observers that failed transitivity, five observers’ decisions
could result from a bias toward selecting the nearer target. In the
context of eye movements, this bias would correspond to a
preference for shorter saccades over longer.
We conjecture that this preference for short saccades could be
an oculo-motor heuristic serving to integrate the visual sensitivity
map into saccade selection. A key prediction of Najemnik &
Geisler’s model [7,9–10] is exactly that observers will prefer short
saccades. Tatler and Vincent [40] presented compelling evidence
that saccade selection could be better predicted by oculo-motor
preferences than by visual information or task.
If human saccade decisions are based on such heuristics rather
than on a computation that requires knowledge of visual sensitivity
maps, we would expect a failure of adjustment when one’s visual
sensitivity map is changed. In fact, when observers’ foveae were
artificially shifted with gaze-contingent techniques, their perfor-
mances in visual search were significantly worse than predicted by
the ideal-observer model [41].
There is evidence that saccade selection and explicit perceptual
decision in visual search pick the same location [42–43]. This was
previously understood as evidence that saccade selection and
explicit decision use the visual sensitivity map in the same way.
However, if humans have little knowledge of their own visual
sensitivity map, as our results suggest, and their saccades are
chosen through oculo-motor heuristics, it might be their explicit
decision actually comes from their saccade behavior. If so, the
observer might have no way of finding out which combination of
eccentricity and contrast offered the higher probability of
successful detection than by observing his preferences among
potential saccades, something like deciding what to have for lunch
by waiting to see which sandwich your hand selects.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Proof for Equation 3.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001023.s001 (0.06 MB
DOC)
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